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Title
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Letter to B. Graham
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Description
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Annex: manuscript titled 'International price stabilization'.
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Date
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1954
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Date in document
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yes
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Formulas or calculations
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no
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Inventory number
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NL-RtEUR_TBCOR01_021G035
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7960
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Storage location
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Specifiek Magazijn
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Filename
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CDM7960_NL-RtEUR_TBCOR01_021G035.pdf
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Provenance
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Jan Tinbergen
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Accrual Method
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donation
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Rights
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Revised transcript
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en
21 April 1954
[59]
Professor Benj. Graham, 122 East 42nd Street, New York 17, N.Y.
Dear Professor Graham,
Please, find enclosed the promised article. I may leave it entirely to you what use to make of it.
Yours very sincerely,
International Price Stabilization
Instability of prices has been the form in which many have experienced the problems - sometimes disastrous to them - of economic instability generally, of the ups and downs of economic life. Price rises have brought them exceptional prosperity, be it mostly for a short time, price falls have sometimes completely destructed their existence. The many of which this is particularly true are the producers of raw materials, agricultural before all, sometimes also of mineral raw materials. Many of these producers have very modest incomes; and there are millions and millions of them, spread all over the world. Moderate price movements in finished goods are transmitted in ever larger amplitude to the sectors more "down" in the process of production, those of semi-finished goods, and of raw materials. The thirties are the most conspicuous years in which such a price fall occurred, bringing down the incomes of farmers to one-half or one-third of what they were before. There are other periods as well, however, and in a way every depression has shown similar tendencies. In addition there have been isolated movements for separate crops, such as coffee or rubber.
It is self-evident that the question has occupied many, can we do away with these harmful price fluctuations? What are their causes, and can we expect to be successful in actions to change those causes? It is an old reply by economists that there are causes "on the side of money" and "on the side of commodities"; meaning that partly the expansions and contractions in monetary circulation, in the hands of governments and the banking system, have caused price fluctuations to occur, and partly changes in physical production, before all crop fluctuations. Although it seems improbable that in the short run much can be done about these crop fluctuations it is possible, by stocking and destocking, to restrict their influence on prices considerably. This is even the oldest, well-known, example, described in the Bible.
The two groups of causes are clearly distinct; one may work without the other; although, on the other hand, changes in crops may also entail changes in the supply of money by banks. Accordingly, two approaches have been made to damp down price movements. On the one hand there are the proposals known as employment policy, or business cycle stabilization, mostly thought of as primarily financial measures tending to spend more public money in dull times and to spend less in times of boom. On the other hand there are a long series of proposals, and of action taken, in the field of stock piling of commodities in abundant supply.
-2-
In the first group proposals have been more frequent than actual policies. Some attempts at applying them have been made, but rather scattered and often mixed up with measures of doubtful use. Anti-depression policies of the thirties are well-known examples; it is well known that they came too late and were combined with unnecessary devaluations and with superfluous direct interventions in production and pricing. Nevertheless there is consensus of opinion, at the present time, that in the event of a new depression something of a compensatory budget policy should be followed by all governments, preferably in concerted action.
In the second group of measures some conspicuous successes, as well as various failures have been recorded. Successful market regulations were performed in tin, tea and sugar in the thirties, as well as in wheat during the last few years; and others could be added. The failures have been analysed and some of them were obviously due to imperfect schemes: schemes either too restricted in geographical area covered or as to the number of coherent markets included. No success is possible if one of a few interrelated markets only is subject of stocking or production regulation. Evidently a major further factor making for failure has been the acceptance of too ambitious price levels as their targets.
What is perhaps the most unsatisfactory feature in the whole situation about price stabilisation is that the problem has hardly been recognised to be a general and not a specific problem; i.e. a problem for all markets together rather than for certain specific markets. It is true that certain writers very clearly emphasized this side of the problem already long ago; but practical policy has been piecemeal all the time and not up to the standard required by the real nature of the problem.
It was a wise decision therefore that the Secretary-General of the United Nations charged a committee of experts with the task to report on the problem of price stability of primary commodities. More precisely the committee were asked to prepare during 1953, a report on such practical measures as it may be advisable to adopt pursuant to certain recommendations formulated by the General Assembly of the U.N. in 1952. These recommendations were based on the desire not to disturb the economic development of raw material producing countries by sudden changes in their terms of trade.
The committee consisted of Professor Carter of Belfast, Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusomo of Djakarta, Professor Goudriaan of Pretoria, Professor Knorr of Princeton and Dr Olano of Buenos Aires. Professor Goudriaan was elected chairman; and the report of the committee, entitled "Commodity Trade and Economic Development", was published during December 1953.
By this report the committee has faced world opinion once more with the true character of the problem of price
-3-
stability. In a very able and clear way the main characteristics of the phenomena have been summarised as well as the most important proposals so far made to deal with their adverse effects. And rightly one proposal has been placed much more in the foreground than discussions had so far, namely the proposal of the so-called raw material standard, made in this country by Professor Benjamin Graham as well as by Professor Frank Graham and almost simultaneously by Professor Goudriaan, then in Holland.
The proposal may seem revolutionary: its main contents is to accept, as the basis of our monetary system, not only gold, but also a so-called "raw material basket", i.e. a fixed combination of certain quantities of the most important raw materials. The basket may be e.g. 100 bushels of wheat, 50 bushels of rye, 80 bushels of corn, etc. It goes without saying that not the commodities themselves but indicative of their ownership should be the real subject of transfer. A basket would always be accepted by the Central Bank at a fixed (or almost fixed) price and equally be sold at a fixed price if anybody so desired.
By this technique - the details of which of course raise many questions - the stability of the price level would be chosen as the corner stone for our monetary system and, in a way, be guaranteed constitutionally. Before discussing the limitations of the system - which it does have, as any system - let us make its main consequences clear.
It would stabilize, to be sure, only one index of prices, namely, an index of raw material prices. By so doing it would, however, stabilize the general price level as well, at least with great approximation. For it is a well-known fact, proved by business cycle statistics for all countries and for a long period: the main source of price fluctuations is the unstable character of raw material prices. Prices of finished goods fluctuate before all since raw material prices fluctuate; wages fluctuate far less and as far as they do it is largely because of fluctuations in food prices, themselves an important component of general raw material prices.
The raw material standard would, on the other hand, stabilize one index, i.e. an average of raw material prices; not each of them separately. Far from being a disadvantage, however, this would be economically sound. It would leave intact the mechanism of demand and supply which determines relative prices between commodities and which counteracts any unhealthy tendencies towards overproduction or restrictionism. It would do no more than the monetary system should, according to the basic principles of economic science: fix the general price level which is not determined by the forces of demand and supply. In
-4-
the discussion between individual stabilization schemes and group schemes it decidedly chooses the latter's side, leaving as much to the free forces of the market as is reasonable and supplementing them at the very point where they have no function to perform.
The consequences would be important not only for the group of raw material producers themselves. They would mean the elimination of all unnecessary unrest in the general price level which also disturbs other sectors of the economy. The most important example is the influence of general price fluctuations on profit calculations. It is a well-known fact that there is a widely spread tendency for business firms to overestimate their profits in times of rising prices and to underestimate them when prices fall. Some authors have even maintained that this "accounting error" is the main cause of business cycles. Statistical evidence would at least show, it seems to me, that it is an important element. However this be it is well known that general price rises and falls also contribute to speculative stockpiling and destocking, as the case may be. Such movements would be largely eliminated, were the raw material standard applied.
Of course it should not be the only instrument of business cycle policy. The generally accepted instruments of public expenditures and taxes should keep their places. But their action would be facilitated and their extent reduced if the general price level would stop fluctuating as it did so far.
Certainly there would be several technical questions to be solved before the system could work smoothly. This article is not the place to go into them in any detail. The main question is the one of the costs involved. These costs will depend to a large degree on the extent of the additional stocks needed: they may be characterised mainly as carrying costs. The size of the stocks, in turn will depend on the other stabilizing policies applied: the more rigorous these are, the smaller the stocks needed in order to keep prices within the desired limits.
But it is not so much the object of this article to convince the reader at once that the raw material standard is desirable. It cannot be but an attempt to arouse interest for it. The United Nations experts have not tried so either; they only recommended a closer study of the system. This is the striking and somewhat ashaming fact: the system, although launched as long ago as twenty years has never been discussed adequately in the circles of the world's financial authorities. It is such a discussion we may now at least hope for.
J. Tinbergen
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annexCount
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1
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extracted text
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2-} April 1954
Professor Benj» Qpaiuu»»
122 East i+2nd Street,
New York 17, F.Y,
Dear Professor Graham,
Please, find enclosed the promised article, I raay
leave it entirely to yoa wxiat use to make of it.
Yours very sincerely.
ff«*rf.'
I
1
•.,^,—.-n -frn.-^pil-ct^
IC
*« fÉI»^ e-ïüoY
'3:B9(1
International Price Stabilization
Instability of prices has heen the form in which
many have extjerienced the prohlems - sometimee
disastrouvs to theni - of economic instability generally,
of the ups and dovms of economic life. Price rises have
brought them exceptional prosperity, be it mostly for a
short time, rrice falls have sometimes completely destructed their existence. The many of v;hich this is
particularly true are the producers of raw materials,
agricultural before all, sometimes also of mineral
raw materials. !%ny of these producers have very modest
incomes; and there are millions and millions of them,
spread all over the world, Moderate price movenents in
finished goods are transmitted in ever larger amplitude
to the sectors more "down" in the process of production,
those of seini-fiuished goods, and of raw materials. The
thirties are the most conspicuous years in which such a
price fall occurred, bringing douTi the incanes of
farmers to one-half or one-third of what they were before. There are other periods as well, however, and in
a v/ay every depression has showxi similar tendencies. In
addition there have been isolated movements for separate
crops, such as coffee or rubber.
It is self-evident that th'. tiuestion has occupied
maixy, can v/e do away with these harmful price fluctuations ? What are their causes, end can we expect to be
successful in actions to change those causes ? It is an
oia reply by economists that there are causes "on the
side of money" and "on the side of commodities",* meaning
that partly the expansions and conxt rsactions in monetary
circulation, in the hands of goverranents and the banking
system, have caused price fluctuations to occur, and
partly chp.nges in physical production, before all crop
fluctuations. Although it seems improbable that in the
short run much can be done about these crop fluctuations
it is possible,by stocking and destocking, to restrict
their influence on prices considerably. This is even
the oldest, well-kno^OTi, example, described in the 3ible,
The two groups of causes are clearly distinct; one
may work without the other; although, on the other hand,
chanp;es in crops may also entail changes in the supply
of money by banks. Accordingly, tv;o approaches have been
made to damp down price movements. On the one hand there
are the proposals known as employment policy, or business
cycle stabilization, mostly thought of as primarily
financial measures tending to spend more public itioney
in in dull times and to spend less in times of boom. On
the other hand there are a long series of proposals, and
of action taken, in the field of stock piling of commodities in abundant supply.
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-2-
In the first group proposals have heen more frequent
than actual rolicies. Some attempts at applying them
have been made, hut rather scattered and often mixed up
with measiires of doubtful use. Anti-depression policies
of the thirties are well-known exairiplesj it is wellknown that they came too late and were comhined with unnecessary devaluations and with superfluous direct
interventions in oroduction and pricing, T-Tevertheless
there is concenaus of opinion, at the present time, that
in th;^ event of a nev/ depression something of a compensatory budivet policy should be followed by all governments, prefei'ably in concerted action.
In the second group of measures some conspicuous
successes, as well as various failures have been recorded.
Successful market repulations were performed in tin, tea
and sugar in the thirties, as well as in wheat during
the last few yearsj and others could be added. The
failures have been analysed and some of them were obviously due to imperfect schemes: schemes either too
restricted in fieoi^raphical area covered or as to the
number of coherent markets included. No success is possible if one of a few interrelated markets only is
subject of stocking or production regulation, Evidently
a major further factor making for failure has been the
acaev.tance of too ambitious price levels as their targets.
^V'hat is perhaps the most unsatisfactory feature in
the whole situation about price stabilisation is that
the problem has hardly been recognised to be a general and
not a s:ecific problem; i.e. a problem for all markets
together rather than for certain specific markets. It
Is true that certain writers very clearly emphasized this
side of the problem already long ago; but practical policy
has been peacemeal all the time and not up to the standard
rectiiired by the real nature of the problem.
It ^rns a wise decision therefore that the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations charged a ccmTiittee of
experts with the task to report on the problem of price
stability of primary ccBumodities, More precisely the
committee were asked to prepare during 1953» a report on
such üractical measures as it may be advisaole to adopt
puT'Suant to certain recommendations fonriulated by the
General Assembly of the U.F. in 1952. These recommendations
were based on the desire not to diBturb the economic
development of raw material producing countries by sudden
changes in their terms of trade.
The cojiunittee consisted of Professor Carter of
Belfast, J^^rofesBor Sumitro Djojohadikusomo of Djakarta,
Professor Goudriaan of Pretoria, Profeüsor Knorr of
Princeton and Dr Olano of Buenos Aires, Professor Gouariaan
was elected chairman; and the report of the committee,
entitled "Commodity Trade and Economic Development", was
published dxiring December 1953.
By this rerort the committee has faced world opinion
once more with the true character of the problem of price
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-3stability. In a very able and clear way the main characteristics of the phenomena have been summarised as well as
the ?r.'ost important proposals so far made to deal with
their adverse effects. And rightly one propoaal has been
placed much laore in the foreground than discussions had
so far, namely the proposal of the so-called raw material
standard, made in this country \)y Professor Benjairdn
Graham as well as by Professor Frank Graham and almost
simultaneously oy Professor Goudriaan, then in •lollmid.
The proposal may seem revolutionary: its main con»,
tents is to accept, as the basis of our monetary system,
not only gold, bxit also a so-called "ravv materdal basket",
i.e. a fixed combination of certain ciuantities of the
most important raw materials. The basket may be e.g. 100
bushels of wheat, 50 bushels of rye, 30 bushels of corn,
etc. It goes v/ithout saying that not the corojnodities
themselves but indicative of their ovmership should be
the real suliject of transfer. A basket would alv/ays be
accepted by the Central Bank at a fixed (or alraoat
fixed) price and eq.ually be sold at a fixed price if
anybody so desired.
By this techniciue - the details of which of course
raise many questions - the stability of the price level
would be chosen as the corner stone for our monetary
system and, in a way, be guaranteed constitutionally. Before discussing the limitations of the system - vhich
it does have, as any system - let us ?nake its main consequences clear.
It would ütaiailize, to be sure, only one ixidex of
prices, narnel^r, an index of raw material prices. By so
doing it would, however, stabilize the general price
level as well, at least with great approximation. 5'or
it is a well-knovm fact, proved by business cycle statistics
for all countries and for a long peï'iod: the main source
of price fluctuations is the xinstable character of raw
material prices. Prices of finished goods fluctuate oefore
s-11 aince x'&w material prices fluctuate; wa-es fluctuate
far less and as far as they do it is largely because of
fluctuations in food prices, thern-selves an important
component of gemeral raw material prices.
The raw material standard would, on the other hand,
stabilize one index, i.e. an average of raw material prices;
not each of thera se-parately. Par frcan being a disadvantage,
hov/ever, this would be economically sound. It would leave
intact the mechaniaa of demand and supply vdiich deteiiaines
relative prices between commodities and which counteracts
any unliealthy tenaencies towards overproduction or
rcBtrictionism. It would do no more than the monetary
system should, according to the basic principles of
economic sciences fix the general price level which Is
not determined by the forces of cleraand and supply. In
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the discussion between individual sta"bj ligation schemes
and group scheines it decidedly chooses the latter's
side, leavinr: as imich to the free forces of the market
as is reasonable and supplementing theia at the very
point v/here they have no function to perform.
The Gonaequeiicea would he important not only for
the group of rav; laaterial prodticers themselves. They would
mean the elimination of all unnecessary uni'est in the
general price level which also disturbs other sectors
of the economy. The most important example is the influence of general irice fluctuations on profit calculations. It is a well-known fact that there is a widely
spread ten.::ency for üusiriess firms to overestimate their
profits in times of rising prices and to imderestiiante
them when prices fall, Rome authors have even maintained
that this "accounting error" is the main cause of business
cycles. Statistical evidence would at least shovf, it
seenis to me, that it is an important element. However
this be it is well knov/n that generaal price rises and
falls also contribute to speculative stockpiling and
destocking, as the case may be. Such movements would be
largely eliminated, were the raw material standard aoplled.
Of course it should not be the only instrument of
business cycle policy. The generally accepted Insti-ujnents
of public expenditures and taxes should keep their X'laceB.
But their action would be facilitated and their extent
reduced if the general price level would stop fluctuating
as it did so far.
Certainly there would be several technical (luestions
to b^^ solved br-fore the system could work smoothly. This
article is not tlie place to go into them in any detail. The
main question is the one of the costs involved. These
costs will depend to a large decree on the extent of the
additional stocks needed: they may oe cliaracterised
mainly as carrying costs. The size of the stocks^ in
turn will depend on the other stabilizing policies applied: the more r'igorous these are, the amaller the
stocks needed in order to keep prices within the desired
limits.
But it is not so much the object of tliis article
to convince the reader at once that the raw material
standard is desirable. It cannot be but an atterapt to
arouse interest for it. The united liations experts have
not tried so eitheri they only recommended a closer study
of the sjvStem. This is the striking and somewhat aBhajiiing
fact: the systeni, although launched as long ago as twsiity
years has never been discussed adecj.uately in the circles
of the world's financial authorities. It is such a discussion we may now at least hope for.
J, Tinbergen
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